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Spanish economic projections report
This report analyses the situation of and outlook for the Spanish economy. It has been pre-
pared by the Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research of the Banco de Es-
paña, taking into account the information available to 13 March. The projections are against a 
background of great uncertainty, as they are made amid a serious fi nancial and economic 
crisis worldwide, whose adverse consequences are diffi cult to determine. The projection time 
span covers the years 2009 and 2010.
The year 2008 saw a severe deterioration in Spanish economic activity which, though it had 
started earlier, gathered considerable momentum during the year. Indeed, following 14 unin-
terrupted years of expanding output, the Spanish economy posted two quarters of negative 
growth in the second half of 2008, against a much worse international backdrop, moving into 
a marked recessionary phase. Nonetheless, the growth rate for the year as a whole was still 
positive (1.2%), chiefl y as a result of the contribution of net external demand to the GDP 
growth rate (at 1 pp), while national demand slowed substantially, with average growth fl atten-
ing in 2008 after having increased by more than 4% in 2007.
The forecasts available for the main economies, made by various agencies and institutions, 
point to a signifi cant contraction in activity in 2009 that would lead to a decline in world output 
for the fi rst time in several decades. The projections in this report also point to a deepening in 
2009 of the current recession in Spain, meaning activity would fall by 3% this year, with an 
incipient recovery in output in late 2010, although over that year as a whole growth would still 
be negative (–1%). The projections for 2009 suggest a continuation of the contractionary 
trends perceptible in the main indicators of national demand, with a strong deterioration in 
both household and corporate spending decisions (on consumption and housing, and in the 
form of productive investment, respectively). Exports will also be dented by the decline in in-
ternational markets, although the fall-off in imports – which will foreseeably be greater – will 
mean that, in net terms, the contribution of the external sector to growth will improve.
The deterioration in agents’ confi dence accompanying the bleaker economic outlook, the di-
minished value of fi nancial and real estate wealth, the fi nancial constraints in place and the 
severe contraction in global trade and in activity in the main industrialised countries are the key 
factors behind the decline in demand. This outlook has been affecting activity with particular 
intensity in the closing months of 2008 and early 2009, but its effects will foreseeably abate 
and be progressively offset by the impact of the fi scal and monetary policy stimuli introduced 
in many countries, Spain among them. These projections reside on the assumption that, fol-
lowing the heightening of the fi nancial crisis in the closing months of 2008, the planned sup-
port to the fi nancial system internationally will progressively stabilise the situation, whereby the 
degree of credit constraint will be alleviated. The reduction in infl ation will also contribute to 
improving agents’ real income and, if the economic climate becomes less pessimistic, to 
boosting spending.
The most acute phase of the adjustment is expected to be behind by 2010. In fact, part of the 
decline in activity projected for 2010 is in response to the drag exerted by the negative rates 
estimated for the current year, since it is foreseen that output will stabilise and even begin to 
grow again (albeit at a very modest rate) in the second half of next year. National demand will 
still be running at a negative rate, though more moderately so, and, within this aggregate, 
private consumption is expected to show small increases once again. During 2010, moreover, 
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the improvement in the international economic climate, which is an assumption common to 
the projections of the various agencies and institutions, should boost exports.
In the case of infl ation, the outlook has changed considerably since mid-2008. For 2008, the 
CPI averaged 4.1%, peaking at 5.3% in July, the result of the sharp rise in oil and other com-
modity prices. Since last summer, when the worsening of the international crisis drastically 
altered the global outlook, the rising trend of the prices of these products swiftly reversed, giv-
ing rise to continuous falls in the infl ation rate, which ended the year at 1.4%. In recent months, 
lower commodity prices have combined with the impact of weakening demand, whereby the 
infl ation rate has dropped further. On average in 2009, the private consumption defl ator is 
forecast to stand at only 0.2%. In 2010, the infl ation rate should rise again once the strong 
baseline effects recorded in 2009 have disappeared, although it is estimated that it will stabi-
lise at a fairly moderate rate of around 1.5%. 
In any event, the marked sluggishness of domestic demand and, to a lesser extent, of economic 
activity forecast for the projection horizon will contribute to correcting some of the imbalances 
built up in the Spanish economy in recent years. That should draw the infl ation rate closer to euro 
area levels, reducing the nation’s net borrowing and cutting the private-sector debt ratios reached 
after many years’ sharp growth in the credit granted to households and fi rms.
The degree of uncertainty that accompanies macroeconomic projections is, on this occasion, 
exceptionally high. The strong deterioration in economic prospects in recent months, the fact 
the current recession is across the board globally and the persistence of the international fi -
nancial crisis, along with the equally forceful economic policy response, mean that powerful 
sources of uncertainty are simultaneously at play and will all affect a macroeconomic projec-
tion exercise performed at a time such as the present. One habitual means of representing this 
uncertainty is to calculate the forecasting errors made in the past and, on this basis, to show 
the bands around which each macroeconomic variable might trend to some degree of likeli-
hood. This is the approach used to show the uncertainty surrounding the growth and infl ation 
projections (see Chart 1). However, as it is based on past forecasting errors, this approach 
tends to understate the current degree of uncertainty, which is much higher than that prevailing 
in recent years which was taken as the basis for calculating these errors.
The substantial downward revision of the growth projections entails, among other things, ac-
knowledgement of the fact that the downside risks identifi ed in recent quarters have been 
progressively materialising. In the new scenario the projections cover there are, however, both 
downside and upside risks. These are probably balanced over the period, since although in 
the short run the risks of deviation are more biased downwards, in the medium term the likeli-
hood of upside risks may prevail. On one hand, among the downside risks, it cannot be ruled 
out that the global recession will deepen, meaning that export markets will decline more sharp-
ly in 2009 and that their recovery in 2010 will be more muted. Likewise, fi nancial instability may 
prove protracted, especially if the decline in activity were to have a feedback effect, exacerbat-
ing credit institutions’ fi nancial problems. The decline in the value of household fi nancial and 
real estate wealth might also be more substantial than implied by these projections, depress-
ing household demand. But, on the other, among the possibilities of upside risks, it should be 
stressed that the projections set out here are consistent with a strong increase in the house-
hold saving ratio in 2009 and 2010 which, were it somewhat lower, would entail a lesser 
negative contribution of private consumption to growth. Further, the extraordinary measures 
adopted by governments and central banks worldwide might also have a sharper or swifter 
impact in terms of resuming positive growth rates, both globally and in Spain, where the sen-
sitivity of the household and corporate fi nancial burden to interest rates is very high.
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In the case of infl ation, the risks surrounding these projections also seem balanced. The weak-
ness of spending has been considered a key factor in the deceleration of prices that had 
shown greater downward stickiness in the past, such as in services, while some easing in 
wages, in unit labour costs and in business margins is assumed. A stronger or more prolonged 
decline in activity, or a greater fall in commodity prices, might make these movements some-
what sharper, although it cannot be ruled out that the Spanish economy will retain some of the 
rigidity in price and cost formation that it has shown in the past.
In sum, the Spanish economy has undergone a very severe adjustment in the past year and 
the economic situation in 2009 and 2010 looks complicated, set against a deep recession 
which will foreseeably make way for an incipient resumption of growth in the fi nal stretch of the 
projection horizon. The overcoming of the international crisis will play a fundamental role in 
setting the pace for the recovery. The correction of the imbalances induced by the strong ad-
justment in demand and activity will help restore growth conditions, but economic policy has 
a pivotal role to play in limiting the high costs that this adjustment is already prompting. The 
strong decline in spending justifi es the use of demand-stimulating policies. Monetary policy in 
the euro area has adopted an openly expansionary stance that will have signifi cant spending-
stimulating effects. These will be progressively discernible as interest rate cuts feed through 
and the plans for the restructuring of the international fi nancial system provide some relief from 
the tendency of credit to contract, with the foreseeable fall in infl ation also contributing. Budg-
etary policy, too, has been used expansively in recent months, reinforcing the already substan-
tial role of the automatic stabilisers. However, the room for manoeuvre available is limited, 
given the rapid increase in the budget defi cit as a result of the high sensitivity of public revenue 
GROWTH AND INFLATION OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN CHART 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
NOTE: The chart shows the uncertainty surrounding the central projection. The intervals have probabilities of
20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 90%, respectively, based on past forecasting errors. It must be emphasised that
current uncertainty is considerably higher than in the past.
Latest data: 2008 Q4.
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to certain features of the Spanish economy cycle and of the increase in public spending that 
the crisis and the measures adopted to combat it entail. In this respect, it should be borne in 
mind that the high budget defi cits projected for 2009 and 2010, above 8% of GDP in both 
cases, are based on the assumption that no discretionary measures additional to those al-
ready approved will be adopted. In any event, the rapid deterioration in the budget defi cit and 
public debt fi gures are highly illustrative of the importance of adopting budgetary consolidation 
plans that allow public fi nances to be guided onto a path of stability once positive growth in 
activity resumes. Beyond the use of demand-side policies, the intensity of the recovery and the 
Spanish economy’s capacity for long-term growth will depend above all on the necessary 
structural adjustments being made to promote enhanced productivity in the long run and a 
change in direction in productive investment. In particular, given the highly negative projection 
made for the labour market, with the unemployment rate rising most substantially in 2009 and 
2010 in the absence of measures, headway in reforms geared to containing the intensity and 
persistence of the employment adjustment acquires particular importance. In this connection, 
mechanisms must be set in place to help ensure that the adjustments are made to a greater 
extent through wages and employment conditions, and not through job destruction.
The section following this summary explicitly sets out the external assumptions underlying the 
projections given in this report. Section 3 makes a detailed diagnosis of the outlook for the 
Spanish economy, and the fi nal section analyses the main risks to the central scenario de-
scribed.
The projections prepared by the Banco de España are based on a set of assumptions about 
the path of the main exogenous conditioning factors of the Spanish economy’s activity, price 
and cost variables. 
Exchange-rate, interest-rate and oil-price projections are based on the respective markets as 
at the time immediately before the projections were prepared.1 It is assumed that the euro 
exchange rate will remain constant at its current value on the spot market in the reference 
period. In terms of the bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate, this means that the average value of 
the euro will depreciate by 14% in 2009 compared with the average for 2008 (see Table 1). The 
short-term interest rate path (measured by the three-month EURIBOR) is obtained from the 
expectations implicit in futures markets. On this information, the short-term interest rate is 
expected to average 1.7% in 2009, almost 3 pp less than in 2008, and 2% in 2010. The long-
term interest rate path, which is approximated through market expectations about ten-year 
public debt yields, is quite stable: 4.3% in 2009 and 4.7% in 2010. Oil prices are expected to 
stand at US$46 and US$51 on average in 2009 and 2010, respectively, according to futures 
markets’ expectations for this commodity in the reference period, making for a decline of more 
than 50% in 2009 relative to the previous year. As to house prices, negative rates of change 
are expected in 2009 and 2010, extending the recently observed path of decline.
As regards credit conditions, it is assumed that the spreads on market interest rates applied 
to loans will hold at similar levels to those observed in the most recent period and that the 
tightening of credit standards will continue, albeit at a lesser pace, easing progressively over 
the course of the projection horizon. However, the diffi culties of incorporating the effects of fi -
nancial restrictions into a projection exercise should be acknowledged, as their impact on 
agents’ spending is subject to great uncertainty.
External assumptions 
underlying the projections
1. To avoid distortions from volatility on any specifi c day, average values from a reference period prior to the cut-off date 
for information were adopted (namely, the two preceding weeks). The calculation of these external assumptions is in line 
with the procedures usually applied in Eurosystem projection exercises.
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Turning to the international environment, future developments in euro area foreign trade vari-
ables match those included in the Eurosystem macroeconomic projections presented in the 
March 2009 edition of the ECB Monthly Bulletin. World output is expected to contract in 2009, 
linked above all to the weakness in the industrialised countries, while it is estimated that the 
emerging countries will retain rates of expansion that are positive but far lower than those 
posted in recent years. The global recession is leading to a decline in Spanish export markets, 
which are expected to decline by 4.6% in 2009, 10 pp down on the estimate a year earlier. A 
modest recovery is expected in foreign markets in 2010, with an increase of 1.2%.
Finally, it should be stressed that these projections include the effects of the various budgetary 
measures approved in Spain in recent months, and which affect various items of public reve-
nue (such as VAT, personal income tax and corporate income tax) and expenditure (public in-
vestment and unemployment benefi ts). By contrast, the effects of possible budgetary or other 
measures which may be adopted in future have not been considered.
GDP growth stood at 1.2% in 2008, 1.2 pp less than projected in the March 2008 report, as 
a result of a more unfavourable performance of practically all the national demand compo-
nents, except government consumption (see Table 2). Exports also performed worse than 
projected a year ago, although the sharp downward adjustment in imports meant that the 
positive contribution of net external demand (1 pp) was higher than foreseen.
In the fi rst half of 2008, activity was still posting quarter-on-quarter growth rates that were 
positive, though more modest than those marking the strong expansion in output in the 
preceding years. The negative trend of household wealth, with falls in share prices and an 
ongoing slowdown in house prices, coupled with the start of the process of job destruction 
and a rising unemployment rate, began to impact household spending decisions, dampen-
ing consumption and depressing residential investment. Investment in equipment also 
showed signs of greater slackness, while exports held on a still-favourable trend. In the 
second half of 2008 the international and fi nancial environment deteriorated severely, par-
ticularly with the heightening of the banking crisis in the United States and the spread of 
Outlook for the Spanish 
economy
Projection
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
International environment
1.26.0-2.37.49.43.53.50.4tuptuodlroW
8.15.6-7.35.62.99.78.012.5stekramlabolG
2.16.4-4.31.61.85.62.88.3)a(stekramtropxes'niapS
9.055.640.897.274.564.453.839.82)tnuoma(srallodniecirpliO
6.07.03.22.01.35.35.0-6.5-)b(oruenisecirptropxe'srotitepmoC
Monetary and financial conditions
72.172.174.173.162.142.142.131.1)tnuoma(etaregnahcxeorue/ralloD
0.27.16.43.41.32.21.23.2EURIBOR)htnom-3(etartseretnimret-trohS
7.43.44.43.48.34.31.41.4)dleiydnobraey-01(etartseretnimret-gnoL
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (*) TABLE 1
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
(*)  Projection cut-off date: 13/03/09.
a. Weighted according to their share in Spain's exports.
b. Weighted according to their share in Spain's exports, adjusted for the effect of third markets.
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
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these tensions to the rest of the world. In Spain’s case, these trends triggered a sharper 
adjustment in consumption and in investment, while the rapid contraction in the main world 
economies led to a substantial reduction in trade and in exports in the closing months of 
the year. The refl ection of this was a decline in confi dence levels to historical lows and a 
more restrictive stance by banks in their credit supply policies, which led the Spanish econ-
omy to experience a decline in activity in the second half of the year. The effects of these 
developments were clearly visible in household spending decisions, since although house-
hold disposable income increased fairly sharply in 2008 (by above 3%), due among other 
reasons to the fi scal impulse, consumption stagnated at 2007 levels, meaning that the 
household saving ratio rose signifi cantly.
The recessionary trend observed in the past two quarters is projected to continue in 2009, 
whereby GDP is expected to fall by 3% over the course of the year, 5 pp down on the March 
2008 projection. Such a substantial revision offers some idea of the abrupt turnaround in the 
world and Spanish economies in the past year. Although the start of the fi nancial turmoil dates 
back to the summer of 2007, the outlook in early 2008 was for a gradual absorption of the 
effects of these tensions, with a limited impact on economies. However, events in recent 
months have given rise to a new phase of instability, which has turned into a severe banking 
and fi nancial crisis, leading the world economy into a generalised recession. In Spain these 
effects have superimposed themselves on the adjustment already under way in the economy, 
especially in the real estate sector, making for a sharper contraction in the macroeconomic 
variables that had already begun to moderate and spreading the decline to other variables 
more sensitive to fi nancial conditions and to the situation of the world economy. The abrupt 
change in economic projections in the past year in Spain and in other areas of the world is 
described in detail in Box 1.
Projection
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0.1-0.3-2.17.39.36.33.31.3PDG
4.0-1.3-1.05.39.32.42.49.2noitpmusnocetavirP
1.25.33.59.46.45.53.68.4noitpmusnoctnemnrevoG
3.01-1.51-0.3-3.51.70.71.59.5noitamroflatipacssorG
6.21-3.42-1.1-0.012.012.91.51.4sdooglatipacnitnemtsevnI
6.11-9.21-3.5-8.39.51.64.52.6noitcurtsnocnitnemtsevnI
9.29.8-7.09.47.65.22.47.3secivresdnasdoogfostropxE
6.2-1.51-5.2-2.63.017.76.92.6secivresdnasdoogfostropmI
4.2-6.5-1.04.43.53.59.49.3)htworgotnoitubirtnoc(dnamedlanoitaN
4.15.20.18.0-5.1-7.1-7.1-8.0-)htworgotnoitubirtnoc(dnamedlanretxeteN
5.12.08.32.34.34.36.31.3rotalfednoitpmusnocetavirP
5.18.04.39.22.33.34.29.2stsocruobaltinU
7.21.33.57.39.37.30.36.3eeyolpmerepnoitasnepmoC
2.13.28.18.07.04.06.07.0ytivitcudorpruobaltnerappA
1.2-2.5-6.0-9.22.32.37.24.2)sbojtnelaviuqe(tnemyolpmE
4.911.713.113.85.82.96.011.11)ecrofruobalfo%(etartnemyolpmenU
6.612.619.212.012.113.113.110.21sHSIPNdnaetargnivasdlohesuoH
Nation's net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) (% of GDP) -2.9 -4.8 -6.5 -8.4 -9.7 -9.1 -5.3 -4.4
General government net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) (% of GDP) -0.2 -0.4 1.0 2.0 2.2 -3.8 -8.3 -8.7
PROJECTION OF THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (*) TABLE 2
Annual rate of change in volume terms and as a % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
(*)  Projection cut-off date: 13/03/09.
Latest QNA data: 2008 Q4.
REVISION OF THE 2009 GDP GROWTH OUTLOOK RELATIVE TO THE PREVIOUS PROJECTIONS REPORT BOX 1
The macroeconomic projections made during the past year for the 
various economies in the world have undergone continual and sub-
stantial downward revisions in step with the ongoing exacerbation of 
the fi nancial crisis and extension of the recession to different areas 
and markets. The projections report on the Spanish economy pub-
lished by the Banco de España on 1 April 2008 also anticipated an 
expansion of GDP in the past year notably higher than actually oc-
curred and, in addition, contained a much more favourable projection 
for 2009. Specifi cally, instead of the output expansion of 2.4% fore-
cast for 2008, the year fi nally ended with a growth rate of 1.2%, ac-
cording to the latest estimates of the Spanish National Statistics Insti-
tute. For the current year, the growth rate of 2.1% projected a year 
ago is 5 pp more than the present forecast. The large scale of this 
revision illustrates the considerable worsening of the outlook for the 
Spanish economy in the time elapsed since the publication of the 
previous projections report.
This deterioration is also manifest in the successive downward revi-
sions of the forecasts of Spain’s 2009 GDP growth by the major in-
ternational institutions. The left-hand panel sets out the forecasts of 
this variable made in the past year by the European Commission, 
the International Monetary Fund and the OECD for 2009, along with 
the Banco de España’s March 2008 and March 2009 projections. 
The change in the outlook since March last year is essentially due to 
two factors: the negative effects on economic agents’ confi dence 
and on their ability to fi nance their spending decisions, derived from 
the persistence of the international fi nancial crisis; and the impact of 
that crisis on the world economy. This outlook worsened more 
quickly following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, a circumstance which explains why, although the downward 
revisions of the Spanish economy’s growth projections have been 
continual over the last 12 months, they became more pronounced 
from October.
Moreover, as earlier mentioned, the effects of the fi nancial and eco-
nomic crisis have been global and have sharply affected all the world’s 
economies. Hence, as in Spain, these have all seen their output 
growth forecasts revised substantially downwards by the various in-
stitutions. As an example, the right-hand panel compares the projec-
tion of Spain’s 2009 GDP growth in this report with that published a 
year ago and with the forecasts released around that time for the euro 
area and the United States included in Consensus Forecasts, a pub-
lication which regularly collects the forecasts of diverse institutions 
and analysts for the world economy. As can be seen, on average the 
Banco de España’s downward revision of the 2009 growth rate is not 
very different from the changes in analysts’ forecasts for the euro area 
and for the United States in the past year. The considerable extent of 
these revisions to 2009 growth projections by institutions for the var-
ious economies underscores the unusually large size of the shock to 
world activity in 2008.
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The fall in GDP in 2009 is based on the decline of all the components of national demand, 
except government consumption, with an impact on growth that is expected to be only partly 
cushioned by the improved contribution of the external sector to output, owing to the strong 
adjustment in the level of imports, which would offset the adverse effect of the substantial 
decline in world trade on Spanish exports (see Chart 2). Private consumption is estimated to 
decline by 3% in 2009 despite the slight increase projected in real disposable income. This 
increase is based on general government continuing to contribute positively to agents’ income 
through higher benefi ts and lower taxes; on lower net interest payments, due to the fall in 
short-term interest rates; and on lower infl ation, which will stand at around 0.2% for the year 
on average, thereby contributing favourably to upholding purchasing power. Against this back-
ground, the decline in consumption in 2009 is refl ected, as was the case last year, in a pro-
nounced increase in the household saving ratio to over 16%, which is a symptom of various 
factors: the high degree of uncertainty surrounding household decisions; the diminished value 
of their wealth; the need to reduce the debt built up in recent years; and, in sum, their caution 
in respect of spending decisions in the near future. 
Residential investment will also fall substantially in 2009, posting a decline of over 20%, insofar 
as supply is adjusting rapidly to the fall-off in demand and to the surplus capacity in the sector 
(see Chart 3). Total investment in construction – comprising investment by companies and 
civil engineering works – will fall on a lesser scale, owing to the positive effect of the State Lo-
cal Investment Fund to be set in train in the second quarter of the current year. On our esti-
mates, the Fund could exert a positive effect of the order of 0.3 pp of GDP growth on average 
in 2009 and 2010. The sharpest contraction is expected to be in investment in capital goods, 
since the reduction of national and external demand, and the great uncertainty over the eco-
nomic outlook, will depress the start-up of new investment projects.
For 2010 it is estimated that activity will continue falling, albeit at a more modest rate of 1%. 
This projection – which assumes that the cyclical trough will be in 2009 – is based on the ex-
CONTRIBUTIONS TO GDP GROWTH CHART 2
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
Latest data: 2008 Q4.
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pected pick-up in the external environment, with world growth somewhat above 2%, and on 
a gradual absorption of the most acute effects of the fi nancial crisis. Actually, much of the 
decline in output projected for 2010 is in response to the drag entailed by the negative rates 
of the current year, since it is estimated that in the second half of next year activity will stabilise, 
and even begin to grow again. National demand is expected to continue shrinking this year, 
albeit at a lower rate, while exports should rise with the help of the recovery in world trade. Net 
external demand is expected to continue making a positive contribution to GDP growth, al-
beit one lower than that in 2009.
The decline in activity will lead to a signifi cant reduction in employment, which is estimated to 
fall by 5.2% in 2009 and by 2.1% in 2010, placing the unemployment rate at 17% in 2009 and 
above 19% next year, if no measures are taken. The rising trend of apparent labour productiv-
ity that began in 2008, and which is linked to the rapid adjustment in labour, especially in 
construction, is projected to continue in 2009, up to a rate of 2.3% (against 1.8% in 2008). 
This rate should, however, moderate to 1.2% in 2010 once the bulk of job destruction in con-
struction has taken place. It is estimated that the growth of economy-wide employee compen-
sation will fall considerably in 2009 as a consequence, above all, of the lesser impact of in-
dexation clauses, caused by the low infl ation rates observed in late 2008. That said, employee 
compensation would still refl ect a relatively high rate of around 3%, relatively inconsistent with 
the decline in activity and with the stagnation of consumer prices. A further fall in the increase 
in this variable, to 2.7%, is projected in 2010, signalling the modest impact of sluggish output 
on wage negotiations. In any event it should also be underscored that, in connection with 
employee compensation, wage developments in the private sector may show greater sensitiv-
ity to cyclical conditions than remuneration in the public sector.
The substantial decline in infl ation projected for 2009 (to 0.2%, against 3.8% in 2008), meas-
ured by the private consumption defl ator, is due above all to the strong fall in oil and other 
commodity prices in recent months, which is in contrast to the escalation seen in these prices 
up to summer last year. But it also refl ects, in part, the easing off in prices prompted by the 
weakness of demand, and which is discernible in the reduction in the year-on-year rates of 
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services and industrial goods prices. The baseline effects of oil and other commodity prices 
will be stripped out in 2010, entailing a rise in the annual infl ation rate, although the slackness 
of demand should be conducive to the growth of the private consumption defl ator holding at 
a moderate level of around 1.5%. 
This recessionary scenario will see a reduction of some of the imbalances that the Spanish 
economy had built up during its previous long upturn. In particular, the contraction in private 
expenditure in 2009 and 2010 will lead to a reduction in this sector’s indebtedness and in the 
nation’s net borrowing. Net borrowing might fall by almost 4 pp of GDP in 2009 and by a fur-
ther percentage point in 2010, dipping from above 9% of GDP in 2008 to 4.4% of GDP in 
2010. The goods and services defi cit is expected to be cut substantially in these two years, 
whereby the bulk of net borrowing at the end of the projection horizon would be determined 
by net interest payments (so-called investment income), which are in response to the sharp 
accumulation of net external liabilities arising from the high defi cits recorded in recent years.
From the standpoint of sectoral net indebtedness, the improvement in the nation’s net borrow-
ing would be the outcome of the adjustment in spending by households and non-fi nancial 
corporations, while it is estimated that the budget defi cit will increase notably. In recent quar-
ters, fi nancing raised by households and fi rms has moved on a strongly decelerating path, 
which has been steeper in the case of companies in the construction and real estate develop-
ment sectors, while lending to manufacturing and services companies was still advancing with 
some momentum in late 2008. This has largely been due to cyclical factors that have borne 
both on the demand for and the supply of funds, although other factors more directly linked to 
the international fi nancial crisis have also had an infl uence. Such factors have been the greater 
diffi culties in obtaining resources on the international markets to which Spanish companies 
had resorted to fi nance part of their activity, and market pressures to raise capital ratios.
The need to adjust the level of household and corporate debt, together with the macroeco-
nomic weakness projected for the coming two years, suggests that the growth rate of fi nanc-
ing raised by these sectors may continue to fall. That would lead to some decline in the ag-
gregate debt ratios which, along with the expected cut in the average cost of outstanding 
debt, would see the associated fi nancial burden fall off, favourably affecting the disposable 
income of these agents. This process will help redress the household and corporate fi nancial 
position, providing for an expansion in spending in the medium term on more robust bases. 
Nonetheless, these developments could prove compatible with an increase in the degree of 
fi nancial pressure on specifi c segments and, in particular, on those with a higher volume of 
borrowed funds and that are more affected by the economic recession. Further, household net 
wealth, which had fallen last year as a result of the unfavourable course of the value of fi nancial 
and real estate assets, might continue declining in the light of the assumed fall in house prices 
incorporated into the macroeconomic projections, generating a negative wealth effect on con-
sumption and investment in property.
The general government sector posted a defi cit of 3.8% of GDP at the close of 2008, 6 pp 
worse than the previous year, and substantially greater than initially projected. The scale of the 
increase gives some idea of the strong impact the recession has had on public fi nances via the 
operation of the automatic stabilisers, although it is also the consequence of the various dis-
cretionary measures adopted to soften the effects of the crisis on demand and of the sharp 
drop in revenue which had a substantial transitory component, linked above all to the prop-
erty boom. In 2009 a signifi cant increase in the defi cit is again projected, to over 8% of GDP, 
which is due to the adverse macroeconomic setting and to the expansionary measures ap-
proved to date. The higher defi cit is expected to be the outcome, above all, of the rise in 
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public spending as a percentage of GDP, increasing the funds assigned to unemployment 
benefi ts, investment and government consumption, against a background of declining GDP in 
nominal terms. The fi scal impulse indicators – which attempt to characterise the budgetary 
policy situation in relation to the economy’s cyclical position – point to an expansionary stance 
in 2009. The defi cit is expected to increase further in 2010. Finally, it is estimated the public 
debt ratio will stand at around 50% in 2009 and 60% in 2010. It should be recalled that this 
most substantial deterioration in public fi nances is based on the assumption that no new ex-
pansionary measures are adopted, which highlights the scant room for manoeuvre available to 
continue using budgetary policy as an instrument to boost demand and the importance of the 
budgetary consolidation plans to resume a path of stability in the medium term.
The projections presented in this report describe a sharp fall in GDP in 2009 and, to a some-
what lesser extent, in 2010, based on a contraction in national demand which is only softened 
by the improved contribution of external demand to economic growth. The year 2008 clearly 
marked the Spanish economy’s entry into an adjustment phase which, in a critical fi nancial and 
international setting, has resulted in a severe recession. Over the course of 2009 it is projected 
that agents will continue revising their consumption and investment spending decisions down-
wards and that the rate of increase of their debt will continue to ease, whereby national de-
mand will decline at a sharp rate of over 5%. The strong adjustment already incorporated in 
2009 and the ambitious demand-boosting economic policy measures adopted nationally and 
internationally mean that a very tenuous recovery may be projected for 2010, although over 
the year as a whole the growth rate would still be negative.
As discussed in Section 1, whether these projections actually materialise is subject to an ex-
ceptionally high degree of uncertainty. In the case of activity, many of the risks identifi ed in the 
past have materialised, and have duly been incorporated into the central scenario projections. 
Looking ahead, the risks surrounding the current exercise are possibly more balanced than in 
the past, with a prevalence of downside risks in the more immediate terms and a greater prob-
ability of upside deviations at the end of the projection period. Undoubtedly, global economic 
activity – in the industrialised and emerging countries alike – may yet feel the impact of the 
international fi nancial crisis to a greater extent than currently anticipated. There might also be 
a negative feedback loop between the economic crisis and the fi nancial problems, further 
impairing credit institutions’ ability to channel fi nancial fl ows and help provide an exit from the 
recession. A bigger contraction in household and corporate spending might not be ruled out 
either given the deterioration in their fi nancial position, worsening confi dence and the poor 
economic outlook. Yet, at the same time, the stimulus provided by budgetary and monetary 
policies globally might lead to a brisker exit from the current recession, although this will most 
likely be in 2010. Furthermore, the various measures adopted to support fi nancial systems 
might alleviate some of the fi nancial restrictions in place in recent quarters. In Spain’s case, 
moreover, the restructuring of household and corporate balance sheets might leave these 
agents better placed in 2010 to embark on new spending, although for this to happen it is vital 
that the current gloomy outlook should lift. A more resolute effort by the authorities to apply 
structural reforms that improve market regulation and foster productivity and competitiveness 
in the economy would also be of great help in improving confi dence.
With regard to infl ation, the risks are also balanced. Evidently, the short- and medium-term 
projections depend closely on oil and commodity market developments, which have shown 
great volatility in recent years. These projections reside on oil prices that increase slightly over 
the projection horizon in step with futures markets, but the greater or lesser slackness of un-
folding world economic activity might evidently alter this assumption. The projections also in-
corporate a dampening effect of the weakness of spending on the price-setting process, in 
Risks to the projections
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line with the greater sensitivity consumer prices have been showing in recent months to more 
fragile demand. Likewise, a sharper or more prolonged decline in activity might strengthen this 
downward pressure on prices, although certain rigidities present in the Spanish economy, 
manifest in the scant sensitivity of wages to productivity and the cycle, and in an insuffi cient 
degree of competition in certain sectors, such as services, might hamper this feed-through of 
the decline in demand to prices.
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